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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Sri\'\ TEl\lENT OF THE KIND OF CASE AND 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Tlw Appellants brought suit to restrain the various 
Hespondents from continuing with the construction of a 
restaurant building on a piece of property 40 feet by 
!JI fed located on North Temple in Salt Lake City. 
Then· \\·a:-:; a hearing· on an order to show cause before the 
HonorahlP l\farcellus K. Snow, who, after counsel had 
<'nten'd into stipulations, dissolved the temporary re-
straining order which had been placed on the property 
in<'ich·nt to the order to slww cause (R 35 ). 
rl1lw case was tried on its merits before the Honorable 
~tPwnrt ~r. Hanson, sitting without a jury, who signed 
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judgment on Hw 25th day of 1\1 arch, 196ti, dismissing the 
action on the merits (R. G4). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts stated in Appellanh;' brief are generally 
correct. An understanding of the facts, however, requin'R 
the following further statement: 
This action involves a parcel of land situate in Salt 
Lake ,City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, mon• par-
ticularly bounded and described as follows: 
Commencing 141.5 feet west of the southeast 
corner of Lot 1, Block 97, Plat "A", Salt Lake 
City survey and running thence west 40 feet; 
thence north 97 feet; thence east 40 feet; thence 
south 97 feet to the point of beginning, togethPr 
with a right of way over land to the east tlwreof. 
At the time of trial, the above described parcel of land 
"·as owned in fee by Respondent vVestern Travel, Inc., 
herein termed "\Vestern." Respondent Western, prior 
to the filing of Appellants' complaint, had leased said 
premises to the Respondent Harold Butler Enterprises 
No. 115, Inc., herein termed "Butler.'' (R. 59) 
Prior to 19'58 Appellants were purchasing the above 
described parcel of land under a contract and prior to 
1960 had transferred their ownership in said parcel to 
the predecessor in interest of Wes tern. In connection 
with such transfer Appellants executed and delivered a 
quitclaim deed wherein a restrictive covenant was im-
posed upon said premises in language as follows : 
"This property shall not be used for the erec-
tion of a motel thereon." (R. 59) 
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lu l\larch, 1965, Respondent Butler acting in accord-
m1ce with the provisions of its lease obtained a building 
permit for the construction of a restaurant upon the 
allow dt-scribed property and immediately thereafter 
('Olllllll'nred the construction of a restaurant building 
upon said premises. Notwithstanding the fact that Ap-
1wllants kne\\· of the commencement and prosecution of 
~a id n•staurant construction no notice of any intention 
to pren•nt such construction was served upon or given 
to H(•spondents until on or about the 15th day of July, 
l %S. At the time of the service of such notice the ex-
tPrior portions of the structure of said building had been 
<·ompldPd with the exception of a small portion of the 
rnof. 'rlw appliances were in the building but not in place, 
and tlwn• had been expended or incurred, including ap-
pliant<'s for the restaurant, the sum of approximately 
$:200,000.00, representing approximately three-fourths of 
thP total cost of the restaurant. (R. 60) 
H(•spondent \Vestern at the time of trial owned a 
pan·el of land adjoining the above-described premises. 
This adjoining parcel has been leased by Western to 
llespondt'nt Hyatt Chalet Motels, Inc., herein tenned 
"Hyatt." On the adjoining parcel Hyatt has constructed 
and at tlw time of trial was operating a motel. There 
is no physical connection between the restaurant struc-
tun• and the motel structure on the adjoining premises. 
ThP 01wration of the restaurant by Butler is separate 
and independent from the operation of the motel by 
l 1 ~·att. The leases by \VestE>rn to Hyatt and Butler are 
"'parak and independt'nt transactioni3, and the busi-
llf'Ss<·s of Hyatt and Butler are distinct enterprises con-
4 
ducted separately by these two Re8pondents and then• 
has been no concerted action or conspiracy between theli! 
rn connecbon with such operations. (R. 60) 
\iVhile the motel and restaurant were constructed by 
the same general contractor, the structures were erected 
under separate contracts, each independent of the other 
and the structures were designed by separate independent 
architects. (R. 60-61) 
The restaurant has a seating capacity for 160 pa-
trons and the motel has a capacity for 100 units. 'l1he 
restaurant was completed and opened for operations in 
the early fall of 1965, and has been in continuous overa-
tion up to the time of trial. At the time of trial, approx-
imately 90% of the persons patronizing the restaurant 
came from the general public, independent of guests of 
the motel. \iVhen the motel is fully occupied it is estimated 
by the restaurant operator that not more than 20% of 
the restaurant patronage will come from guests at the 
motel, and that the remaining restaurant patronage will 
come from the general public. (R. 61) 
The premises above described upon which the cove-
nant above set forth is imposed are completely occupied 
by the restaurant structure and no part of the motel is 
located thereon. The restaurant constructed and operated 
by the Respondent Butler upon the premises hereinabove 
described is not a part of the motel constructed and 
operated by Respondent Hyatt upon adjoining premises. 
(R. 61) The only question is whether or not this restau-
rant building and the use thereof violates the restrictive 
5 
<·o\ <·nant which prohiLits "the erection of a motel there-
on. 
,. 
Appellants, of course, could not show that a res-
taunrnt is a motel; therefore their evidence was geared 
to tlw proposition that inasmuch as the restaurant was 
constrnded in conjunction with the construction of the 
adjacent Hyatt Chalet l\Iotel, that it was a part of the 
~lotPl Cornrilex and therefore, by association, a motel. 
'l'lH· trial court, over the continued objection of counsel 
for ali of the Hespondents permitted the Appellants to 
intrnduel' hearsay evidence from magazines, tourist court 
,ion rnals, telephone books, etc., describing motels, hotels, 
t'('stamants, and complexes of various kinds. It also per-
mitted ''expert" witnesses to describe the nature of the 
rnotd business. rrhe best characterization and summa-
tion of this "evidence" was in the testimony of l\fr. Leon 
Dalt> Rt·<,d who is District Governor for Best vVestern 
).I okhi in \Yashington and the Province of British Co-
l umhia. He testified that under the "motel umbrella" 
;m• many businesses which increase in number as motels 
dPn·lop throughout the country. His conclusion was that 
it wonld he difficult to conceive of any business that 
m;g-ht not be under this "motel umbrella." An example 
given was Covey's Little America, which is actually 
"a little citv" under the ''motel umbrella" (R. 167). 
Hespondent Butler's evidence consisted primarily of 
b·stirnon:' given by Richard G. Sharp and Donald Daniel. 
~rr. Sharp testified that he is an architect and supervised 
tli<• eonstruction of the restaurant building which was 
dPsig-n<'d by architects who had nothing to do with de-
signing of the Chalet Motel. The restaurant plans were 
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m ac·cordanct-- ,,·ith other n·stauranb design for th. 
DPnn:- ehain, \d1ieh chain is Pntirely indPpendPnt nf tlJ .. 
!f yatt Chalet. (R. :23S-:2-!3) 
.Jir. Daniel testified that he had managed tht> re:' 
taurant in q_uestion sincP its opening on October ~9, 
1965. The restaurant has a seating capacity for 160 people. 
The majority of its business comes from the general 
public - not from the motel guests. (R. :2-!5) He esti-
mated that in tlw tourist season about SOS( of tht' re:--
taurant's business comes from the general public, and 
in the "-inter months about 90% to 95%. ( R. :2-!.5-G) 
Other e\idence \\-hich the Court had came from hi~ 
\isit to the premises in company with all counsel repre-
senting the parties. 
After considering all of the evidence the Court 
granted Respondents' motion to dismiss. 
ARGl'~IEXT 
POIXT I. 
THE RESTRICTIYE COYEXA ... '\T ·wHICH 
PROYIDES: '"THIS PROPERTY SH ALL 
XOT BE rsED FOR THE ERECTIOX OF A 
~I OT EL THERE OX'' DOES XOT APPLY TO 
THE ERBCTIOX OF A RESTAl-RAXT. 
It would seem to counsel that the very statement of 
Point I answers itself. Appellants, however, argue other-
wise, and by a liberal use of the word •·motel" apply it 
as an "umbrella" which co\ers other businesses, includ-
ing Butler's restaurant. Such an interpretation is exceed-
ingly liberal, to say the least, and contrary to the strict 
-
' 
inl1· ot' (_·011:-;trnction applil·d by the courts to restrictive 
1·1JY1·nanb. 
(a) lfrstrictil'c crnenants are strictly construed. 
Tlie C'onrts have almost nnivenmlly stated the rule 
tltat the:· do not favor restrictions upon the utilization 
, ,f land, and that such covenants are strictly construed 
ill favor of the free and unrestricted use of the property. 
In Oard11er c. Jlaffitt, 7-! S.\V. 2d 60-! (Mo., 193-!), 
tliPn· \ms an appeal from a judgment of the lower court 
in favor of the plaintiff in a proceeding to remove the 
cloud of a building line restriction. The Court stated: 
"The intention of the parties is the paramount 
and controlling question. That intention is to be 
a:-;eertained from the terms of the deed considered 
in tlw light of the circumstances surrounding the 
partit's. Restrictions, being in derogation of the 
foe conveyed, "-ill not be extended hy implication 
to include anything not clearly expressed. • • * 
Doubts arising as to the intention of the parties 
mu::-;t be resolved in favor of the free and un-
tnu1111w led nse of tlw land." Id., 7-! S.\Y. 2d at 607. 
In 81;orn I'. Occrlzolt, 262 P. 2d 828 (Kan., 1953) 
then• \\·a:-; involved an action to construe a restrictive 
eonnant in each of two warranty deeds against the erec-
tion of an:· dwelling costing less than $3,000.00 and con-
taining- lt>ss than four rooms. The plaintiffs had erected 
an apartment on the parcel of land in question. The 
('nmt in holding that the covenant did not prohibit the 
n1•dion of the apartment, stated: 
"The rules governing the construction of 
(•nvenants imposing restrictions on tht' nse of 
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realty are the same as those applicable to anv 
contract or covenant, including the rule that 
where there is no ambiguity in the language usvd' 
there. is no room for construction, and the plai 1~ 
meanmg of the language governs." Id., :2(i2 P. ~fl 
at 830. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas further stated in the 
Sporn case, supra, its rule of strict construction as fol-
lows: 
"Another well-settled rule is that covenant::; 
and agreements restricting the free use of prop-
erty are strictly construed against limitations 
upon such use. Such restrictions will not be aided 
or extended by implication or enlarged by con-
struction. Doubt will be resolved in favor of the 
unrestricted use of property." Id., 262 P. 2d at 
830. 
Moore v. Stevens, 106 So. 901 (Fla., 1925) involwd 
a case in which the appellant erected a vocal studio on 
a parcel of land with a covenant stating that the land 
should be used only for residential purposes. The Su-
preme Court of Florida in upholding the covenant stated: 
"Covenants restraining the free use of real 
property, although not favored, will neverthelP~s 
be enforced by courts of equity where the inten-
tion of the parties is clear in their creation, and 
the restrictions and limitations are confined to a 
lawful purpose and within reasonable bounds. 
* * * Such covenants are strictly construed in 
favor of the free and unrestricted use of real 
property, but effect will be given to the manifest 
intention of the parties as shown by the language 
of the entire instrument in which the covenant 
appears when considered in connection with the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction * ~, '. 
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\V or~s m;ed must be given their ordinary, obvious 
111eanmg as commonly understood at the time the 
instrument containing the covenants was executed 
·~ .:, * or unless it clearly appears from the context 
that the parties intended to use them in a differ-
<mt sense." Id., 106 So. at 903. Wing v. Forest 
Lawn Cemetery Assn., 15 Cal. 2d 472, 101 P. 2d 
1099 (19~·0), is to the same effect. 
\V rite rs in tht> field are in agreement with the cases 
cited herrin. Tiffany states: 
"The courts do not favor restrictions upon 
the utilization of land, and that a particular mode 
of utilization is excluded by agreement must clear-
ly appear." Tiffany, Real Property, Vol. 2 (2d ed. 
1920), sec. 394 at p. 1427. 
11hompson on Real Property states: 
"Covenants restraining the use of real estate 
an• strictly construed in favor of the free and 
unrestricted use of such property, with due regard 
for the purpose contemplated as well as the cir-
cumstances surrounding the transaction. Pursuing 
the philosophy that lands should be free and un-
encumbered whenever possible, courts have de-
veloped a strong tendency to construe restrictive 
eovenants very strictly." Thompson, Real Prop-
erty, Vol. 7, sec. 3160 at p. 106-107. 
Thompson further states: 
"All doubts should generally be resolved in 
favor of the free use of the property and against 
restrictions.'' Thompson, op. cit., at p. 108. 
Tlw Ftah Supreme Court appears to be in agree-
nwnt with the cases cited and has so declared in Parrish 
' r. Richards, S Utah 2d -119, 336 P. 2d J22 (1959). That 
ease involved a restrictive covenant which provided that 
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there shall be erected on the land in question no "struc-
ture" other than a garage and one single family dwelling 
not to exceed one story in height. This Court held that 
this restriction did not forbid the erection of a tennis 
0ourt surrounded by a wire fence. rrhe Court stated: 
"The trial court followed the correct doctrine 
that in the construction of uncertain .or amuig-
1wits restrictious the courts will resolve all do11[Jts 
in favor of the free and irnrestricted 'Use of the 
vroverty, and that it 'will have recourse to ewry 
aid, rule, or canon of construction to ascertain th~ 
intention of the parties'." Id. at 421. 
(b) The ordinary and approved usage of the term 
"motel" does not include "restaurant," even 
though the restaurant may be i1sed in con-
junction with a motel. 
The question then arises as to what is the "ordinary" 
or "approved usagt>'' of the term ''motel.'' There an' 
several cases bearing upon this point. 
The Court stated in the Parrish case, supra, that: 
"The same methods used for construing statutes can lw 
applied to restrictive covenants." Id., at 421. Thereforr, 
use may be made of Section 68-3-11 of the Utah Code, 
which stat(JS as follows: 
''Rules of construction as to words and 
phrases. - Words and phrases are to be construed 
according to the context and the approved usage 
of the language; but technical words and phrases, 
and such others as have acquired a peculiar and 
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by 
statute, are to be construed according to such 
peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.'' 
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In the case of Schermer v. Freniar Corp., 114 A. 2d 
j;'i/ (N .. J., 1955), the New Jersey court in construing the 
!lleaning of the word "motel" stated: 
''The word 'motel' generally denotes a small 
hotel where lodgings are available for hire, with a 
minimum of personal service being furnished by 
the proprietor." 
rrhe New York courts have been in line with the de-
ci::;ion stated above, but discounting more than most of 
the jurisdictions the idea that motels involve more than 
.Jllt:it sleeping quarters. In Von Der Heide v. Zoning Board 
uf Appeals, 123 N.Y. Supp. 2d 726, 204 Misc. 746 (1953), 
the Court stated: 
"But a motel is commonly understood to be 
an establishment essentially different from an inn 
or hotel in design, purpose, and use. From early 
times, an inn or hotel was * * * 'a house where a 
traveler is furnished, as a regular matter of bus-
iness, with food and lodging while on his journey'. 
* * * On the other hand, a motel, as one generally 
understands the terms, and as typified by the 
building sought to be erected by the petitioner, 
merely furnishes the transient guest with sleeping 
quarters and bath and toilet facilities, with linen 
service and a place to park his car." Id., at 730. 
1'he Von Der JI eide case, supra, seems to clearly 
indieate that, using the rule of ordinary meaning, the 
\rnrd "motel" means no more than a place to sleep and 
park one's automobile. 
A Pennsylvania appellate court seems to clearly 
~cparate motel facilities from restaurant facilities. In 
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In Re Longo'.., Appeal, 13:2 A. 2d 899 (Pa., 1957), the 
Court stated: 
"Hophistry and :::;emantics to the contrary not-
withstanding, the words 'motel' and 'hotel' lmve 
different connotations. A motel niay be operated 
U'ith ·or without restaurant facilit·ies. Certainl-y a 
motel without a restaurant is not a hotel." Id ., 
132 A. 2d at 901. (Emphasis sup]Jlied). 
In ilf etropolitau Jui·cstrnc11t Co. v. Sine, 1-t Utah :JG, 
376 P. 2d 9±0 (19G:2), the Utah Supreme Court uplwld 
t]w coyenant re:::;tricting the erection of a motel itself, in 
an action brought against the Appellants in this ea:::;e. 
On the basis of the JJlctropolitan case, s·upra, the 
Court limited itself strictly to the question of the erec-
tion of a ''motel,'' and therefore there has been no circmn-
venti on of the ease by the building of a restaurant on the 
premises in question. rrhe Court has us<:>d language sup-
porting this proposition, i.e.: 
"To prevent an imposing motel on N ortlt 
Tt>mple Street as far as possible was the main 
rPason drf endants purchased the property from 
FPndrelakis in the first place, and they carried 
out this purpose in requiring the restriction a~ 
a condition of sale to Mr. Neilson***." Id., at 42. 
The Court also used the term without any reference to 
a restaurant or any motel complex: 
"If a large nwtel was erected, in part, on the 
:'mhject property * * "'." Id., at 42. 
13 
POINT II. 
Tll E APPELLANr:11 IS PRECLUDED FROM 
THg gQUITABLE RELIEF HE SEEKS BY 
rn~ASON OF LACHES. 
rrho Court in its Findings of Fact found that in 
}[areh, 19G5, the Appellants knew of the commencement 
of th<> construction of a restaurant on the premises in 
question hut that no action was taken to prevent further 
eonstruction until on or about the 15th day of July, 1965, 
when the Respondents had expended approximately 
$:.W0,000.00 on the building and equipment. This finding 
was amply supported by the evidence. 
The Court, however, in its Memorandum Decision 
( H. 5 7) did not base its determination on laches. The 
point is argued here because it was incorporated in Re-
sponch,nts' motion to dismiss. The general rule of law 
is that: 
''A complainant seeking equitable relief against 
the violation of a building restriction must act 
promptly on discovery of the ground for com-
plaint, as otherwise his laches may bar his right 
to relief." 26 C.J.S. Deeds, Sec. 172, p. 1182. 
Several cases are cited in support of the above text 
but none of them are Utah decisions. A complete search 
of the Digest System has disclosed no Utah case on the 
point in question. An annotation at 12 A.L.R. 2d, p. 396, 
entitled "Building Covenant...,Laches or Delay" collects 
man~T cases on the subject. The following two cases are 
illustrative of the foregoing rule and are pertinent here. 
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Coates, et al. v. Young Women's Christian Ass 11 . 
Philadelphia, 91 Atl. 863 (Pa., 1914), involved an action 
to restrain the erection of a building in violation of a 
building restriction prohibiting the erection of house~ 
fronting on a certain street. It appeared that a contract 
for a building fronting on the street, and to cost $19,-
281.00, was let September 18, 1913, and its construction 
began shortly thereafter. All passing by could see that 
it fronted on the prohibited street, and that the work wat' 
steadily progressing. The plaintiffs learned in Septernb<'r 
and early in October that the work was going on but 
made no objection until November 8, and gave no noticP 
until November 11, when the building was nearly com-
pleted and substantially all the subcontracts had been 
let. The court on appeal found that the lower court had 
properly held that the plaintiffs' right of action \nl~ 
barred by laches. 
Mercer, et ux. v. Keynton, et ux., 127 So. 859 (Fla., 
1930), involved a situation where restrictive covenants 
as to the construction of buildings upon real estate did 
not appear in the immediate deed of conveyance, but 
were contained in the Muniments of Title of Record so 
as to bind a purchaser. An injunction to restrain a viola-
tion of the restrictive covenants was denied without prr-
judice. It was held upon appeal that the denial would 
be affirmed whe,.e there was delay in seeking injunction 
pending which the construction of the building progressed 
so far as to make it inequitable to grant an injunction. 
The plaintiffs had knowledge of the construction of the 
building on or about March 22, 1928, but made no com-
plaint until the filing of an action on April 30, 1928, 
15 
when the framework of the entire building had been 
<·0111pleted. 
CONCLUSION 
:F'or the foregoing reasons the Judgment of the 
Trial Court should be affirmed. 
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